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ABSTRACT 
 
Richard Rorty once suggested that, following a rigorous process of auto-critique, analytical 
philosophy attained coherence at a stylistic level, rather than being co-terminus with 
philosophy as such. Rorty’s subsequent reassurance that this was no bad thing, since the 
analytical style was, after all, a good style, seems less than reassuring, in part because of the 
philosophical resistance to style. Stanley Cavell – a philosopher certainly possessed of a 
distinctive style – has drawn attention to the tension, within philosophy, between the 
stylisation of and responsiveness to experience. Taking Rorty’s and Cavell’s reflections as a 
starting point, this paper considers the status of George Santayana’s philosophy in relation to 
overlapping questions concerning style: prose style within philosophy, styles of philosophy, 
and philosophy as a style. Santayana’s poetic materialism and modest meta-philosophical 
premises make style central to his work in ways that anticipate the questions raised by Rorty 
and Cavell. 
The question of an American style in philosophy is somewhat – and rightly – fraught, given 
the uncertain status of nationality and style alike within philosophy, their simultaneous 
presence and absence, with both factors at once inescapable and repressed. In his essay 
“Philosophy in America Today”, Richard Rorty suggested that contemporary analytical 
philosophy attained unity and coherence by virtue of a shared style rather than through an 
agreed upon set of discipline defining problems – that analytical philosophy was one 
philosophical style amidst others rather than co-terminus with philosophy as such. The 
suggestion was in some ways incendiary, and his subsequent reassurances could hardly be 
expected to placate. Austin wrote of “the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it 
back”; one characteristic of Rorty’s style is that “the bit where you take it back” only 
sharpens and further entrenches the initial claim (Austin 1962, 2). Here is Rorty’s 
reassurance: “In saying that ‘analytical philosophy’ now has only a stylistic and sociological 
unity, I am not suggesting that analytical philosophy is a bad thing, or is in bad shape. The 
analytical style is, I think, a good style” (Rorty 1982, 217). If this seems to be slim comfort, it 
is because the question of whether analytical philosophy represents a good or a bad style is 
entirely dwarfed by the gravity of the initial suggestion – that analytical philosophy is not just 
marked by but coheres as a “style”, with the term’s overriding implication, intended or 
otherwise, of mere style. This type of stylistic plurality is contrasted with earlier periods of 
confident consensus (logical positivism, for instance, evoked for Rorty by Reichenbach’s Rise 
of Scientific Philosophy (1951), or mid-century analytical philosophy) characterised by substantial 
agreement as to philosophical method and goal alike. Two different senses of “style” come 
together in Rorty’s overview: the very fact of a plurality of philosophical styles is taken to 
suggest the further claim that each of these philosophies finds coherence precisely through 
style. 
Rorty goes on to distinguish between scientific and literary styles of philosophy: 
“The former style asks that premises be explicitly spelled out rather than guessed at, that 
terms be introduced by definitions rather than by allusion. The latter style may involve 
argumentation, but that is not essential; what is essential is telling a new story, suggesting a 
new language-game, in the hope of a new form of intellectual life” (Rorty 1982, 220). This 
contrast can appear prejudicial, or no contrast at all, since to regard scientific philosophy as a 
style seems already to have collapsed philosophy into literature. It is instructive to compare 
Rorty’s approach here to that of Stanley Cavell. At first glance Cavell’s work seems to fit 
more or less straightforwardly within Rorty’s new story about contemporary American 
philosophy. Cavell, after all, is a philosopher with an undoubtedly unique philosophical style, 
a particularly striking example, then, of the plurality of contemporary philosophical styles 
sketched by Rorty. There is a fundamental difference, however, since Cavell’s undoubted 
stylistic innovation – not only as a writer of philosophy but also in terms of the texts he is 
prepared to read as philosophy – is informed and controlled by a nuanced companion 
commitment ascribing to philosophy a significant degree of difficult continuity and 
experiential permanence. Rorty is relaxed about divergent styles of philosophy because, at a 
meta-philosophical level, he holds “that philosophy is not the sort of thing that has an 
historical essence or mission” (Rorty 1982, 220) from which such styles might depart. 
Cavell’s stylistic innovation assumes and works to retain an essence to philosophy that is at 
once institutional and experiential. This wish to delimit a relatively autonomous sphere for 
philosophy reflects Cavell’s modernism, in opposition to Rorty’s strong historicist or 
institutional account whereby philosophy “is not the name of a natural kind, but just the 
name of one of the pigeonholes into which humanistic culture is divided for administrative 
and bibliographical purposes” (Rorty 1982, 226).   
  
In the introduction to Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, Cavell compares his own 
“picture of art as a chapter of the history or progression of philosophy” with the “current 
prominence, perhaps dominance, in Anglo-American professional philosophy of the 
‘naturalizing’ of philosophy, which means regarding philosophy as, in Quine’s phrase, a 
chapter of science” (Cavell 2005, 2). Thinking of art as a “chapter” of philosophy 
acknowledges a degree of pluralism but refuses a free eclecticism, since each chapter is part 
of and circumscribed by a broader narrative. A proliferation of styles might be read, of 
course, as the failure of a discipline to attain a paradigm and, thereby, progress, so Cavell’s 
insistence that art form a part not only of the history but also of the “progression” of 
philosophy is polemical. 
 Cavell further refuses an uncontrolled eclecticism of philosophical styles through the 
claim that both strands of philosophy are commensurable insofar as they are considering a 
similar question or shared problem: “These are not head-on clashes of philosophical 
ambition; the greater contretemps would be if they failed to touch. What is at stake is, even 
before the idea of knowledge, the sense of how human experience is to be called to account. 
The classical empiricist’s idea of ‘impressions’ as the origin, or cause, of ‘ideas,’ like Quine’s 
‘check-points of experience’ in the service of theory-building, stylizes experience” (Cavell 
2005, 2). Referring to scientific strands of philosophy as stylising experience levels the 
discursive field somewhat by implicating the scientific strand in questions of style rather than 
seeing it as prior or neutral. Cavell concedes that the empiricist stylisation of experience is 
pragmatically justified by its undoubted fruitfulness, but notes that this stylisation risks a 
reductive narrowing of experience. He identifies his philosophical task as one of “wording 
the impressions made upon me by the things and persons and events of the world, the ways 
they matter to me, count for me, a capacity in the word ‘impression’ whittled away in the 
empiricist’s ‘impressions.’” (Cavell 2005, 2) The worry is that such whittling, however 
purposive, is only partially responsive and therefore potentially reductive, insufficient for any 
philosophy that wishes, with Cavell, “to articulate and preserve the richness of […] 
experience” (Cavell 2005, 3).  
 The questions that Cavell and Rorty pose here, concerning the surprisingly wide 
reaching ramifications of style (encompassing style within philosophy, styles of philosophy, 
and the philosophical stylisation of experience) were addressed several decades earlier by 
George Santayana. We can see this in Rorty’s suggestion, for instance, that the representative 
image of the philosopher, having shifted historically from scholar to scientist, might be 
updated and revised to that of lawyer. The contemporary analytical philosopher, for Rorty, is 
distinguished by their facility for argumentation rather than by wisdom or by their privileging 
of scientific method: “Perhaps the most appropriate model for the analytical philosopher is 
now the lawyer, rather than either the scholar or the scientist. The ability to construct a good 
brief, or conduct a devastating cross-examination, or find relevant precedents, is pretty much 
the ability which analytical philosophers think of as “distinctively philosophical’” (Rorty 
1982, 221).  
Santayana habitually described professional philosophers as resembling lawyers, 
preparing so many cases in defence of their favoured philosophical systems. In Santayana’s 
hands, the comparison was unambiguously pejorative, since he contrasted such lawyerly 
activity with the pursuit of truth: “Those who are genuinely concerned in discovering what 
happens to be true are rather the men of science, the naturalists, the historians; […] But 
professional philosophers are usually only scholastics: that is, they are absorbed in defending 
some vested illusion or some eloquent idea. Like lawyers or detectives, they study the case 
for which they are retained, to see how much evidence they can gather for the defense, and 
how much prejudice they can raise against the witnesses for the prosecution; for they know 
they are defending prisoners suspected by the world, and perhaps by their own good sense, 
of falsification. They do not covet truth, but victory and the dispelling of their own doubts. 
What they defend is some system, that is, some view about the totality of things, about 
which men are actually ignorant” (Wilson 1998, 48). 
Appropriately enough, then, when Santayana introduced his own philosophical 
system in Scepticism and Animal Faith, some throat clearing was in order, with Santayana 
assuring the reader that his system “differs widely in spirit and pretensions from what usually 
goes by that name” (Edman 1953, 368). Santayana’s system differed in pretension in part 
because it made no claim to describe the world on its own terms, seeing human knowledge 
in all its forms as symbolic rather than literal. For Santayana, this applied to scientific as 
much as to any other type of knowledge so that, to an extent at least, Santayana anticipates 
Cavell’s caution that philosophy should not impoverish experience by styling it exclusively 
after its pragmatic and scientific uses. (Santayana’s epiphenomenalism, however, complicates 
the question of whether his philosophy is able, in Cavell’s terms, to “articulate and preserve 
the richness of experience” – particularly if one wants experience to have a say in contesting 
its own scope.) Even Santayana’s cornerstone materialism is strangely literary, and is perhaps 
better described as his “signature” materialism, given its idiosyncratic character, his system 
more cultural artefact than scientific building block. For Santayana, as Hodges and Lachs 
write, “[t]he word ‘matter’ is, when all is said and done, a poetic term without literal 
significance, merely gesturing toward that which lies at the limit of all meaning” (Hodges and 
Lachs 2000, 99). 
Santayana sought, further, to evade the circularity of defending his system in local, 
internal terms, in part by confessing to and acknowledging that system’s very relativity, but 
also by considering it an expression of pre-philosophical, pre-reflective orthodoxy. Santayana 
claimed that his “essential doctrine […] rests on public experience. It needs, to prove it, only 
the stars, the seasons, the swarm of animals, the spectacle of birth and death, of cities and 
wars” (Edman 1953, 372). The highly arguable suggestion here is that his materialism is a 
commonsense rather than theoretical commitment, such that his philosophy escapes the fate 
of becoming merely one more school. Although his “system” will issue in a suitably esoteric 
and even obscure sounding vocabulary, the materials from which that system is constructed 
pertain to ordinary experience rather than to specialist knowledge. Santayana’s style is that of 
the wise philosopher scholar, but this style is somewhat deceptive. His eventual philosophy 
claims for itself the style and grandeur of a metaphysical system, but it is metaphysical only 
“in the mocking literary sense of the word” (Edman 1953, 369). Santayana’s system building 
is ironic because it retains something of the style of traditional philosophy even as it deflates 
the pretensions of metaphysical systems by recasting them precisely as so many stylisations 
of human experience. Conscious of at least some of the ironies of offering “one more 
system of philosophy”, Santayana still sought to ground that philosophy (to use his terms) in 
the psyche’s life amidst things, as that life is stylised by or symbolised in spirit (Edman 1953, 
368).  
There is another and perhaps more obvious sense in which Santayana can be 
positioned in relation to the question of an American style in philosophy. Santayana’s 
identification or discursive construction of what he referred to as the genteel tradition in 
American philosophy involved the (less than celebratory) uncovering of an American style of 
thinking. This stands in need of qualification, however, since Santayana found American 
philosophy characterised for the most part by survivals rather than expressions. Rorty 
welcomed this puncturing of American exceptionalism, praising Santayana for being 
“entirely free of the instinctive American conviction that the westering of the spirit ends 
here – that whatever the ages have labored to bring forth will emerge between Massachusetts 
and California, that our philosophers have only to express our national genius for the human 
spirit to fulfil itself” (Rorty 1982, 60). Santayana did not expect an American fulfilment of 
the human spirit, of course, although he was, on balance, more contemptuous of the 
teleological fictions of metaphysical idealism than of American thought and culture. For 
such fulfilment to be possible, in any case, would require that the ‘national genius’ be 
expressed at all. On Santayana’s account, however, native styles of thinking emerge within 
American philosophy only as subversive outgrowths and stunted rebellions against the 
inherited, official composite of Calvinism and metaphysical idealism that constituted the 
genteel tradition. To an extent, then, Santayana regretted the very absence of an established 
American style in philosophy. Santayana’s compelling narrative account of the American 
philosophical scene, though, complicates this notion. His re-description of American 
philosophy is characterised by specific and inter-related styles of writing, thinking and 
argumentation, all bearing the stamp of his favoured brand of cognitively neutral 
materialism. It is also informed, less obviously, by recognisably American philosophical 
influences and styles.  
Although Santayana presented American philosophy as choked by European 
intellectual paradigms, out of step with the material energies of American culture and society, 
this did not prevent him from finding that culture and society surprisingly saturated by and 
responsive to philosophy as such. Santayana’s writing modelled a broad-brush type of 
intellectual history that, even as it revised Hegelian dialectic – offering a series of dramatic 
and ironic narratives with nature and matter rather than spirit at their heart – was empirical 
more in principle than in fact. His Character and Opinion in the United States lends more 
prominence to philosophers and, if not to technical, then to specialist philosophical debates 
than the book’s title would lead its readers to reasonably suppose. One of the key American 
influences on Santayana’s philosophical style derived from his Harvard teacher and 
colleague, William James. Santayana took seriously James’s suggestion that philosophers are 
swayed as much by temperament as by argumentation, and nationality indeed often emerges 
in Santayana’s philosophy in hopelessly dated terms as temperament, with temperament in 
turn sketched as a matter of adjustment to and expression of such factors as climate, 
geography and history. In this way, Santayana recast idealist speculations about national spirit 
or character in materialist terms. 
Temperament comes to assume a prominent role in Santayana’s work. In his often 
repeated rehearsals of what Santayana understood to be the false steps of American 
pragmatism and British empiricism, temperament and nationality are equal in explanatory or 
diagnostic status to argument and dialectic, fully at home in the space of reasons and perhaps 
even prior in terms of their importance. In Character and Opinion in the United States,, Santayana 
portrays the British empiricist wish to try conventional beliefs in the tribunal of “experience” 
as motivated by a cultural need as much as by a purely intellectual itch: the “hard-headed 
Briton […] was anxious to clear away those sophistries and impostures of which he was 
particularly apprehensive, in view of the somewhat foreign character of his culture and 
religion” (Santayana 1956, 16).  Experience, happily understood as “knowledge produced by 
direct contact with the object”, ought to have led to method, to intelligence, to science…to 
materialism (Santayana 1956, 16). Instead, and unhappily, the empiricist concept of 
experience was psychologised and therefore halted, turning in on itself and becoming 
introspective, attesting only to its own presence rather than to contact with things. The 
decisive misstep from experience as experience of things to experience as absolute is 
presented by Santayana as at least as much cultural as dialectical in origin: “[w]hat prevented 
British empiricism from coming to this obvious conclusion was a peculiarity of the national 
temperament. The Englishman […is] fond of musing and withdrawing into his inner man. 
Accordingly, his empiricism took an introspective form; like Hamlet he stopped at the how; 
he began to think about thinking” (Santayana 1956, 16). How seriously should we take the 
decisive force given here to temperament, this splicing of philosophical argumentation with 
reflections on supposed national character? Unusual enough that a book whose title 
promises a study of national character and opinion should consider philosophical 
argumentation in such detail, but to then find sketches of national temperament playing an 
integral role in the rehearsal of philosophical ideas seems outlandish. Santayana lamented 
that for the British empiricists “a set of pathological facts, the passive subject-matter of 
psychology” came to seem “the only facts admissible” (Santayana 1956, 17), but how 
admissible exactly are his own ruminations on character and temperament? 
 It might be said, of course, that they amount to no more than ornamental flourishes, 
helping moreover to make philosophy vivid for a non-philosophical audience who might 
already by wondering how the dialectical relationship between empiricism and idealism 
pertains to the American character. Santayana did note, and not without with some 
unintended humour, that his system contained “some refinements in speculation, like the 
doctrine of essence, which are not familiar to the public” (Edman 1953, 369). For the most 
part, though, Santayana’s insisted that his philosophy was non-metaphysical and non-
specialist, and as such could “only spread a feast of what everybody knows” (Edman 1953, 
372), echoing Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy leaving everything as it is – something 
easier said than done. Santayana’s appeals to character and temperament are considered and 
deliberate, then, in two respects. First, such appeals are fully consonant with his care to align 
his philosophy with pre-philosophical instincts and faiths: “I stand in philosophy exactly 
where I stand in daily life; I should not be honest otherwise. I accept the same miscellaneous 
witnesses, bow to the same obvious facts, make conjectures no less instinctively, and admit 
the same encircling ignorance” (Edman 1953, 369). Secondly, they chime with his wish to 
evade and render ironical the form of life of professional academic philosophy altogether. If 
this blurring or crossing of boundaries in Santayana’s philosophy between narrow 
philosophical argumentation and broader cultural reflection constitutes an argument in itself, 
involving not so much an exaggerated claim as to the reach of philosophy as a further 
reminder of its modestly human locus and of our impressionability to matter, it is also 
underway in Santayana’s writing style. 
With his several influential portraits of the genteel tradition, Santayana identified an 
American style of philosophy, albeit a style mostly inherited, and rebelled against only in 
partial, pent and symptomatic ways. Santayana’s own status within the canon of American 
philosophy has been much discussed, with philosophers and intellectual historians noting the 
influence of such thinkers as Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce and William James. Some 
of the traits that Santayana ascribed to the genteel tradition make an unexpected, even 
prominent appearance in his own work. His memorable description of Emerson as a thinker 
who read “transcendentally, not historically, to learn what he himself felt, not what others 
might have felt before him” (Wilson 1998, 43), hardly sounds like praise, keeping in mind 
Santayana’s valuing of tradition over Romantic subjectivity, but echoes his later confession at 
having treated philosophers “somewhat cavalierly, not at all from disrespect or 
quarrelsomeness or lack of delight in their speculations, but because my interest has seldom 
been strictly philological or historical. I have studied very little except for pleasure, and have 
made my authors a quarry or a touchstone for my own thoughts” (Schilpp 1940, 543). At 
least that “quarry”, has a materialist ring to it, nearly enough to distinguish Santayana’s 
transcendental reading from that of Emerson, the latter feeding on books, which “for a 
philosopher or a poet, is still to starve” (Wilson 1998, 43). 
Santayana wrote, archly, of philosophers arguing against rival positions by 
assimilating them to their own views, thereby bringing them into disrepute: “I am well aware 
that idealists are fond of calling my materialism, too, metaphysics, in rather an angry tone, so 
as to cast discredit upon it by assimilating it to their own systems” (Edman 1953, 370).  He 
frequently did the opposite – presenting rival philosophies in the best possible light by 
refashioning their insights in terms of his own materialism: “I endeavour to retain the 
positive insight of each, reducing it to the scale of nature and keeping it in its place” (Edman 
1953, 371). This enterprise involved entangling philosophy with temperament and with 
material considerations. In “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy”, for instance, 
Emerson and William James are presented as winning at least some distance from that 
tradition, with its residual Calvinism and unbound idealism, but this is distance secured as 
much through their “personal spontaneity” and “vitality” as by intellectual argument (Wilson 
1998, 54). This material expressivity is particularly direct in the case of James, whose 
“[c]onvictions and ideas came to him, so to speak, from the subsoil” (Wilson 1998, 54). The 
status of Santayana’s qualification (“so to speak”) is potentially complex and uncertain here. 
In one sense the claim that ideas arise from the subsoil is not figurative at all, given 
Santayana’s epiphenomenalism, whereby ideas are indeed thoroughly a product and part of 
the material world, ideas possessing undoubted reality even as they lack causal efficacy or 
power. In another sense, the qualification “so to speak” might accompany and preface all of 
our thoughts and ideas, given Santayana’s insistence on the symbolic rather than literal 
character of human knowledge. Santayana’s further premise that the speculations of fellow 
philosophers should be taken as delightfully expressive rather than cognitive – with ideas 
significant for being held rather than for being true or false – was more likely to infuriate 
than to come across as a winning absence of quarrelsomeness. The upshot here is that style 
is in any case not to be understood in terms of mere style: Santayana’s engagements with his 
fellow philosophers amount to materialist re-descriptions within which turns of phrase do 
significant philosophical work. His very materialism, moreover, which he claims is non-
metaphysical since it “does not profess to know what matter is in itself” (Edman 1953, 370), 
leads him to an account of thought as stylisation. 
The intellectual historian Paul Conkin provided a compelling analysis of Santayana’s 
life and work, reading the philosopher somewhat against the grain by situating him 
emphatically in the American grain. On Conkin’s account, Santayana emerged as another of 
the Puritans and Pragmatists of his book’s title, with the singularity of Santayana’s philosophy 
consisting in its combining rather than bypassing these two strands of American thought – 
Santayana might prefer the term “strains” to “strands”, given his opinions of Puritanism and 
pragmatism alike. He said of himself that “it is as an American writer that I must be counted, 
if I am counted at all” (Schilpp 1940, 602). The choice of words here is interesting – rather 
than using the term “philosopher”, he states that he is to be counted as an American writer. 
Perhaps the implication is that, although Santayana understood his cornerstone 
philosophical premises as in a sense stable beyond contingencies of location – the sense in 
which his philosophy would have been the same “under whatever sky I had been born” 
(Edman 1953, 372) (“sky” already a sufficiently abstract way of rendering place) – they were 
also expressed through disagreements of a local, specifically American origin and occasion.  
My purpose here is not to oppose American philosophy and American writing but 
rather to focus attention on Santayana’s style. In the context of a discussion of Kantian 
philosophy, Jean Luc-Nancy once noted that the “misfortune of a dreadful style in writing 
has befallen more than one philosopher – perhaps all of them” (Luc-Nancy, 2008). It might 
be said that Santayana’s prose style has the misfortune of being less than dreadful, with its 
very elegance raising suspicions about its character or even status as philosophy. Henry 
Aiken noted that Santayana’s accomplishment as a writer risked obscuring his achievements 
as a philosopher: “Nearly everyone pays lip service to Santayana’s powers as a stylist. Yet to 
many, by no means all of them analytical philosophers, his manner of writing has seemed 
essentially unsuitable to its genre. Under the present dispensation, philosophical discourse is 
not regarded as a branch of literary art. […] Its aim, more properly conceived, is said to be 
the logical analysis of concepts and the clarification of propositions” (Aiken 1953, 339). The 
requisite style for this type of activity, Aiken noted, was that of Bertrand Russell. Santayana’s 
writing style, by contrast, appeared: “clogged with imagery and laden with all the tropes that 
are so maddening to a literal mind. It represents, or so it said, the mind of a poet who for 
some perverse reason insists on dealing with subjects inherently alien to the poetic 
imagination” (Aiken 1953, 340). Aiken was aware, of course, that the assumptions informing 
this response overlooked the fundamental premises or “poetics” of Santayana’s philosophy, 
which lent a form of epistemic parity to literal and figurative modes. Further familiarity with 
the fundamentally aesthetic and poetic status of human understanding within Santayana’s 
philosophy, however, would be unlikely to make his work any more attractive to those 
already unforgiving of his style. 
This sense of Santayana’s style of writing and argumentation as running against the 
professional grain echoed aspects of Russell’s own account. Russell remembered “something 
rather prim about Santayana. His clothes were always neat, and even in country-lanes he 
wore patent-leather button boots. I think a person of sufficient intelligence might perhaps 
have guessed these characteristics from his literary style” (Russell 1956, 94).  Russell’s sketch 
of Santayana navigating country-lanes in his button boots captures something paradoxical in 
the latter’s philosophy, its essentially aesthetic, unworldly materialism. The portrait both 
contradicts and evokes Santayana’s ideas – suggestive on the one hand of an almost gothic 
mal-adaption to the environment and subsequent lack of harmony, matched on the other 
hand by an inner harmony of scrupulous organisation and self-definition, albeit self-
definition that runs the risk of singularity.  
It should be noted that if style is understood as that which departs from tradition, it 
held little interest for Santayana, with wisdom for him consisting in a self-conscious, 
untroubled awareness of human knowledge as itself a form of stylisation, accompanied by a 
valuing of philosophical commitments and systems as so many ironic ontologies. Happily 
conceding the “rigidity and untimeliness” of his philosophical views, Santayana suggested 
that the “common” misunderstanding of those views “is rather my fault, because I have 
clothed them in a rhetoric that, though perfectly spontaneous and inevitable in my own 
thoughts, misleads at first as to their character, and in some readers may induce an assent 
that afterwards has to be rescinded. I am a Scholastic at heart, but I lack the patience and the 
traditional training that might have enabled me to discuss every point minutely, without 
escapades or ornament or exaggeration or irony. My books would then have been much 
more solid, and nobody would have read them” (Edman 1953, 604). Until one understands 
the internal link between Santayana’s style and his philosophical doctrines, then, that style 
will mislead, and this is only compounded by escapades, ornament, exaggeration and irony. 
Less comfortably, but in the same vein, Conkin writes of Santayana’s “private nomenclature” 
(Conkin 1968, 431), describing his thought as “a nightmare of subjective definitions” 
(Conkin, 1968, 444). 
If James’s pragmatism supplied a new name for some old ways of thinking, it might 
be said of Santayana that he deployed some old names in the service of what was in fact a 
new style of thinking. The suggestion that his philosophy is characterised by innovation or 
novelty, of course, would not be entirely welcomed by Santayana. Although his vocabulary 
(of “essence”, “system”, “being”, “truth”) seems traditionally philosophical, such terms are 
re-articulated in his work in a way that tempers their metaphysical drift. This point is well 
made by Hodges and Lachs, who refer to Santayana’s “self-displacing” and “ironic” 
ontology whose “central purpose…is to let the air out of the grand metaphysical systems of 
the past” (Hodges and Lachs 2000, 91). In their suggestive comparative study Thinking in the 
Ruins, they argue that Wittgenstein and Santayana share an equally anti-ontological 
sensibility, with both philosophers acknowledging and seeking to do justice to the brute fact 
of contingency. This affinity, however, is obscured, since Santayana retains, if only to 
subvert, traditional philosophical terms that Wittgenstein wishes to avoid entirely. Although 
Santayana deploys the term “essence”, for instance, his “commitment to the infinity of 
essences” resembles Wittgenstein’s “demonstration of the indefinite multiplicity of language-
games” in that both are “strategies for getting out of the blind alley of essentialism” (Hodges 
and Lachs 2000, 95). Readers of Santayana should not let his style – with its “faint echo of 
old ways of philosophizing” – lead them to the “seriously mistaken assumption that 
Santayana is a system builder after the systems have failed, an atavistic anomaly in 
contemporary thought” (Hodges and Lachs 2000, 88).   
 The title of this essay stages a comparison and contrast between Jamesian 
pragmatism and Santayana’s poetic materialism. The contrast is intended to question 
Santayana’s preferred sense of himself as a philosophical traditionalist rather than an 
innovator, entirely in control of the ironies of making it new. Although Santayana saw 
Jamesian pragmatism as retaining the egotism of idealism, Santayana’s own philosophy risks 
a different, stylistic egotism. Santayana described James – in temperamental terms – as a 
restless figure impatient with philosophy: “[i]t would be incongruous […] to expect of him 
that he should build a philosophy like an edifice to go and live in for good. Philosophy for 
him was rather like a maze in which he happened to find himself wandering, and what he 
was looking for was the way out” (Santayana 1956, 57). James’s Wittgensteinian search for 
the way out, however, can be seen as a wish for that very contact with things from which 
Santayana’s own philosophical edifice effectively withdraws. Speculation, for Santayana, 
arises out of the proper sense ‘that what you can do avails little materially, and in the end 
nothing” – a potentially dispiriting thought but one that should lead to a form of 
compensation that is fundamentally aesthetic: “Let us be content to live in the mind” 
(Wilson 1998, 64). Santayana’s “materialism” becomes in fact a chastened version of 
idealism, characterised by faith in rather than knowledge of the external world – an edifice 
from within which to retreat, away from things, into fragile, reflective spirit.  
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